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et al.: Constitutional Law--Personal Rights--Council of Defense Acts: Bas
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

liable on a contract purporting to be for a future corporation, on
the ground that there was no existing principal and that when the
corporation later came into being it could not logically ratify a
contract which it could not itself have made. Kelner v. Baxter,
L. R. 2 C. P. 174. This was followed in Massachusetts. Abbott
v. Hapgood, 150 Mass. 248, 22 N. E. 90G. Later cases in England
spell out a liability on the part of the corporation, but require a
showing of an express new contract of identical terms. See H. S.
Richards, "The Liability of Corporations on Contracts Made by
Promoters", 19 HARV. L. REv. 97, 102. American courts, where
there are acts by the corporation appropriating the benefits of the
contract, make it liable by what is termed an "adoption" of the
contract. Munson v. Syracuse R. Co., 103 N. Y. 58, 8 N. E.
355; McArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 319, 51 N. W. 216.
The true basis for the holding is not, it is submitted, an anomalous "adoption" of the contract, but an implied in fact novation.
The principal case is, in outcome, in accord with this American
rule. But the opinion goes farther knd says, by way of dictum,
that once the corporation has become liable the third party has
then generally the "double security" of the corporation and of the
promoters. The only authority cited is a previous dictum of the
same court. Strause v. Richmond Woodworking Co., 109 Va. 724,
65 S. E. 659. Cf. Fentress v. Steele, 110 Va. 578, 583, 66 S. E.
870, 872. The meaning intended by the language used is not
clear. It can hardly be meant that there can ever be a double recovery on such contracts. If it be meant that the promoters and
the corporation may be held jointly liable or that one or the other
may be held at the option of the third party it is submitted that
this is inconsistent with the only theory upon which the corporation
can be held, i. e., upon an implied in fact novation. -S. C. M.
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West Virginia: statute
(ACTS 1917, c. 12 § 2) provided that every able bodied male resident of the state between the ages of sixteen and sixty years, except
bona fide students during school term, who should fail or refuse
to engage regularly and steadily for at least thirty-six hours a
week in some lawful and recognized business, profession, occupation or employment, should be held to be a vagrant and be guilty
of a mis9demeanor, regardless of the financial ability of such perACTS: BASIS
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son to maintain himself without such work, and regardless of his
ability to obtain such employment. The petitioner was arrested
for violating this statute. He now brings habeas corpus proceedings on the ground that the sfatute is unconstitutional. Held,
petition granted. Ex parte Hudgins, 103 S. E. 327 (W. Va. 1920).
For a discussion of this case, see NOTES, p. 171.
DEAD BoDIE.--This was an
action of trespass on the case for wantonly and willfully disintering the remains of the plaintiff's mother and son, exposing the
same to public gaze and removing them to another burial place
without the plaintiff's permission. The plaintiff alleges he suffered mental anguish and great humiliation as a result of the defendant's acts. Held, judgment for the plaintiff. England et al.
v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 104 S. E. 46 (W. Va. 1920).
Originally at common law no property rights were recognized
in a dead body. Regina v. Sharpe, 7 Cox 0. C. See 3 CoxE's INDEAD
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On burial it

became a part of the soil and the owner of the land would have a
right of action for trespass. The modern cases universally allow
recovery to certain persons for disinterment or mutilation of a
dead body. There are, however, many divergent theories as to the
basis of recovery. One is that it is founded on the next of kin's
right to possession. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307. Another is
the law recognizes property in a human corpse, but property
subject to a trust and limited in its rights. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew,
207 Pa. St. 313. The principal case and others rest recovery on
the ground that there is a quasi-property right in the next of kin.
It is not alone with reference to property that legal rights exist.
Koerber v. Patek, 102 N. W. 40. There is, as the law develops, a
tendency to protect more and more the intangible rights of privacy and personality both individual and group. See Pound,
"Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality", 29 HARv. L. REv. 640. The greatest obstacle to allowing recovery for injury to such interests is that there is no external
voucher for the reality of the injury. Spade v. Lynn & Boston
R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88; Homans v. Boston Co., 180
Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737. It is submitted that the true ground in
the principal case for giving recovery is that the mutilation or removing from its resting place of a dead body, without permission
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